In discussing aerial warfare, Hanson compares the German V-1 and V-2 campaigns and the Japanese Kamikaze (divine wind, named after typhoons that played a key role in defeating Kublai Khan's attempts to invade Japan) effort. He sees advantages to each, though all 3 were desperation measures that amounted to an admission of defeat.
The V-1 pulsejet cruise missile was slow and vulnerable to Allied air defenses, which took out many of them. They were very inaccurate, and thus useful only for area bombing. Their short range meant that once the Allies overran most of Belgium they could no longer hit London. But they were relatively cheap to produce, and of course cheap in manpower to use -- very desirable at a time when Germany no longer had the fuel to train pilots with anything close to accuracy. The V-2 was fast and invulnerable to air defenses, with greater range. But it was still inaccurate, and far more expensive than the V-1. Even with all the buzz bombs shot down on the way, Germany was better off using them instead of the technically brilliant rockets in terms of dollars per death. Cost-effectiveness is very important in a war of attrition. The V-1 was even more terrifying, partly because the V-2 sruck suddenly and randomly, without warning.
The kamikazes were even cheaper, since they made heavy use of thousands of obsolete warplanes available in Japan. The manpower cost was high, obviously, though overall probably similar to the losses in the conventional attacks during the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, and it didn't required skilled pilots (just as well since Japan had so few left by then). And they were actually a lot more accurate than the V-weapons because their human guidance system was far more reliable than the German mechanical guidance. A lot of mostly small ships were sunk by kamikazes, and hundreds were damaged. Allied sailors killed by them were about twice as numerous as Japanese losses.
Overall, the Japanese probably accomplished more at less material and fiscal expense. But none of these weapons offered any serious prospect of an Axis victory. Perhaps the V-weapons could have done more if they carried nerve gases (tabun, sarin, and soman), which only German possessed. But even those couldn't have matched the power of an atomic bomb, though the first fire-bombing of Tokyo was probably the deadliest air attack of the war -- worse than Hamburg or Dresden, worse than Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Of course, casualty figures for these attacks are all just estimates. Japanese cities were extremely vulnerable to fire -- indeed, Hanson points out that fires from a 1923 earthquake may have killed more people than the fire-bombing.