Hanson brings up some interesting points about airborne forces. Early on, they had some (expensive) successes, in the Netherlands (and at Fort Eben Emael) in 1940 and on Crete in 1941. Allied air landings in Sicily and Normandy did work, but left troops scattered all over the place due to winds. And Market-Garden failed, as did the little German landing during the Battle of the Bulge. Russia made a few airborne landings that were total failures. The British did succeed during the crossing of the Rhine, but it didn't make any difference. And since then, while we have helicopters carrying troops into and out of battle, we don't have much in the way of paratroop assaults. They worked early on by taking the defenders by surprise. And even on Crete, strong winds and poor intelligence led to 4 German battalions landing on top of British troops -- one at each site. (Hanson doesn't go into that much detail, but I still recall from a very detailed book on Crete that I read at Purdue.) You can guess the results. The results on Crete may be why Hitler never tried a landing on Malta.
Airborne forces were often elite units, though. You need to be to fight that way, even if you don't end up doing so. German paratroopers played a key role at the Third Battle of Cassino. On the other hand, an untrained paratroop unit was routed in the assault on Berlin. Calling them paratroopers didn't make them so.
Hanson points out the effectiveness of the better German troops, through good equipment and excellent training (and, though he doesn't mention it, superb NCOs). Japan had good, fierce troops, with good infantry weapons. But Japan was poorly supplied with heavy equipment -- and also with food, ammunition, and medicine. After the fall of Corregidor, they never won another major land battle. Germany was more successful, since they had good heavy equipment and maintained some air power longer.
Italy we can forget about. They had the least industry of any major power, and were exhausted by fighting in Abyssinia, Spain, and Albania before they decided to pick up a few cheap conquests at the end of the war in the West -- only to discover that Britain was staying in. Those cheap conquests, mainly in British Somaliland, ultimately came at a heavy price.
The Allies were much better supplied and (thanks largely to American truck factories) more mobile than Germany, and had superior air cover as well most of the time after mid-1942. They were also much better troops than their enemies thought they were. And superior troop quality can erode during a long war, as happened to Prussia in the Seven Years War, the Army of Northern Virginia after Gettysburg, and Germany (especially its infantry) as their losses mounted. By late 1944, many of their infantry divisions were converted to Volksgrenadiers made up of green troops with doubtful leadership. Some of them were described as armed mobs.